

The Comparative Study on the Participation of Civil Society Organizations on the Peace Process: The Cases of Southern Philippines and Southern Thailand

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Abstract

The objective of this paper is to compare the involvements of civil society organizations from Mindanao, southern Philippines and southern Thailand on the peace process. The concept and method applied in this paper are the role of civil society on the peace process in the global perspective and Civil Society Index (CSI). In this study predominantly research articles and secondary data publications were applied. The study found that CSOs in Mindanao and southern Thailand have been playing various important roles on many dimensions of the peace processes which are more different than similar. The major difference is the grounding of the six basic principles since 1990s which emerging the political settlement on the negotiation with different rebel groups while the reluctant of Thai government to previously address the separatism problem and mention on rebel groups since 2004, caused the retarded political solution and less CSOs participation the on peace process. Even if the initiation of Mindanao civil society organizations in the peace talk went earlier since the late 1990s, while the awakening and involvement of civil society organizations in the southern Thailand recently initiated during 2013 peace talk. However, this study help us understand the significant steps of the civil society from both countries involving the peace processes in order to learn their weaknesses and strengths from each country, and especially would be beneficial to civil society organizations movement in southern Thailand.

Keywords: civil society organizations, Mindanao, southern Thailand, peace process, Civil Society Index

■ Introduction

The objective of this study is to compare the involvement of civil society organizations (CSOs) from Mindanao, southern Philippines and southern border provinces of Thailand to the peace process. This study will helps us understand significant steps of the civil society both countries involving the peace process in order to learn their differences and similarities from each country, and especially would be beneficial to the movement of civil society organizations in the southern provinces of Thailand. The concepts applied to this study are the role of civil society in peace processes and Civil Society Index (CSI) for comparing two cases across four analytical dimensions which are structure space, value and impact.

CSOs in Mindanao, the southern Philippines are considered as the key actors to conflict resolution and peace building for many years. Their peace efforts could be tracked back from the 1970s but accelerated

in the 1990s. During the era of President Joseph Estrada (1998-2001), the armed hostilities erupted during the first quarter 2000 (Rood, 2005, p.1). Despite the sustained and varied actions, civil society, had not been able to end war and bring in the Government of the Philippines (GHP) and Moro Islamic liberation Front or MILF peace panel back. Until the governance of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001-2010), not only Mindanao civil society groups involved in the peace process obviously and directly but they also helped Arroyo government moved toward peace such as upholding consultation on cessation of hostilities with the MILF in 2001, creating political pressure on both government and MILF to revive peace negotiation. Then under the precedency of President Benigno Aquino III (2010-2016), the efforts of civil society were more intense to involve in the many processes of peace negotiation.

For southern Thailand, since January 2004, violence plagued the three southernmost provinces of Thailand

which are Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and 4 districts of Songkhla, the root cause of conflict can be traced back during the nineteenth century power struggle between Malay Muslim movement and Thai State. After the outbreaking situations, CSOs in southern Thailand initiated many efforts at the beginning such as victim rehabilitation, justice and local community development. While there were the government efforts on several informal peace talks between Malay Muslim movement and Thai government since 2004 including with the latest formal peace talk in 2013 but southern Thai CSOs' role still have not much engaged.

■ Concept

In fact, the role of CSOs in the peace process is varied. Many researches give better understanding about scope of civil society role should be adapted in the peace process. There is a study found that the inclusion of civil society in peace agreements significantly increases the chances for lasting peace but it is not clear especially on the role of civil society in the negotiation (Nilsson, 2012, pp.243-266). Although most scholars agree that civil society must take part in the negotiation process but in reality, mediators or negotiators often block civil society out. This is because conflict parties consider that the complicated situation is difficult for civil society to engage. Moreover, they believe that civil society does not understand or unaware of the procedures and techniques of negotiation that need to be prompt with the how to conduct (Chuffrin & Saunders, 1993, pp. 155-128).

Nevertheless, besides peace negotiation, many academic papers insisted that civil society has important role in many dimensions of the peace process (Belloni, 2001, pp. 163-180; Orjuela, 2003, pp. 195-212; Aall, 2007, p.477; Paffenholz, 2010). Thania Paffenholz explained that there are many and different roles of civil society on the peace process which are protection, monitoring and evaluation, advocacy, socialization, social cohesion or facilitation and service delivery (Paffenholz, 2010). While Soliman M. Santos, JR. Esq clarify more of the role of civil society as observer or witness, human resources and

networking (Santos, 2005). Moreover, Catherine Barnes described the important functions of civil society in the peace process including monitoring and evaluation, advocacy and facilitation (Barnes, 2005).

To compare two cases studies, due to the limitation of the sources and information the concept of Civil Society Index (CSI) is partially applied. This index was developed by Civicus for extensive studies of the cases as there is no valid single indicator that can capture the complex nature. The first dimension, structure, examines the overall size and the make up of the civil society arena, its actor activities and resources. The second dimension focuses on the external environment in which civil society exists and functions, and the extent to which various aspects of that environment are enabling or disabling. The third dimension assesses the values that are practiced and promulgated within the civil society arena and extent to which these values serve the common good. The fourth dimension evaluates the impact of activities pursued by civil-society actors particularly with regard to governance and development goals (Anheier, 2004, p. 32) (Hollaway, 2001, p. 37)

■ The Comparison of two countries

1. *Environment dimension*

The conflict in Mindanao is complex but the focus of this study is on the separatist conflict. The conflict in Mindanao started in 1970s under the President Ferdinand Marcos administration on the Jabidah massacre which alleged as killing of Moro soldiers by members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Vitug & Gloria, 2013). This tragic situation let Mindanao CSOs interested in peace building effort since then. In response, the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) formed to establish independent Mindanao following many splintered from MNLF, the MILF (The Moro Islamic Liberation Front) the largest insurgency which want to establish Islamic state.

Then the late of 1990s, President Corazon Aquino (1986-1992) paved the way to the series of negotiations with MNLF and creating the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). In 1992 National

Unification Commission established (NUC) to be a systematic grassroots consultation which led to the acceleration long series of workshops and meetings to arrive at positions in all peace negotiations with many anti-government groups such as the leftist party (National Democratic Front-NDF, Reform the Army forces Movement-RAM) and MILF (Rood, 2005, p. 22). However, through the mid-1990s, even there were many agreements and between the Philippine government and Muslim separatists but civil society could not access to the peace process. (Rood, 2005, p. 32).

Even there was agreement between GPH and MILF in 1997 but it was abolished in 2000. On the Presidency Joseph Estrada, GPH want to weaken MILF's capability to undermine the territorial integrity of the Philippines by declared "all-out war" in the first quarter of 2000 against the MILF. Consequently, there was a sequence of attacks between Philippine military force and MILF. By that time of armed hostilities, CSOs from different stripes engaged in many activities related to the conflict in Mindanao (Rood, 2005, p. 2).

In 2001, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo served as the 10th President of the Philippines, she issued policy all-out-peace policy that brought CSOs, especially the business sector and the religious groups to cooperate with the government to resume negotiations with the MILF in November 2000 (Rood, 2005, p.7). By consultations, CSOs helped government move toward peace on the first round of peace negotiation in Tripoli, Libya in June 2001 and also held a peace forum in parallel with the peace negotiations including restoring cease-fire in 2004. The involvement of CSOs in this period reflected the that even there was opportunity of CSOs to give consultation to the government but only a few civic leaders were able to offer advice but their voice was not very influential (Arguillas, 2001, pp. 14-15).

Under the administration of President Arroyo, the Office of Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) which created by former President Ramos redefined according to Arroyo's policy framework for peace to carry out the comprehensive peace process. Her peace process agenda maintains the basic six

principles defined by the National Unification Commission (NUC)⁽¹⁾ during the administration of President Ramos. OPAPP played a major role in pushing negotiating panels with different rebel groups (OPAPP). In this regard, OPAPP have been seeking more collaboration with civil society and sustaining partnerships to the development track to support the peace negotiations (OPAPP, 2010).

Until the Presidency of Benigno Simeon Cojuangco Aquino III, the peace negotiation between GPH and MILF was a good sign because there was the strong support and discussion from various sectors such as CSOs, academics and even government officials. Then, on October 15, 2012, MILF and GPH has signed Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro or FAB. FAB provides power to Transition Commission or TC from variety of Bangsamoro people to draft the Bangsamoro Basic Law or BBL to replace the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). This unified network of civil society organizations consisted least 150 networks including Muslims, Christians and indigenous people who want to support and Bangsamoro Basic Law (Security Reform Initiative, 2015).

In summary, for the environment dimension of Mindanao context, the peace negotiation and the engagement of CSOs based on the national six basic principles. For this reason, even there were the massive casualties from war but the enduring peace policy of each governments tried to follow these principles which also include the power of CSOs in their effort. However, the case of southern Provinces of Thailand is different. Since 2004-present, the Thailand national politics has been unstable, the chaotic and complicated of civilian politics led to two military coups in 2006 and 2015. But, there are opportunities for CSOs in southern Thailand because chronic violence situation in the region activated government including CSOs to tackle the prolonged conflict.

(1) The NUC composes of six common principles (Six paths to peace) The first, pursuit of social, economic and political reforms. The second, consensus-building and empowerment for peace. The third, peaceful negotiated settlement with different rebel groups. The fourth, holding the programs for reconciliation, reintegration into mainstream society and rehabilitation. The fifth, addressing concerns arising from continuing armed and The sixth, building and nurturing a climate conducive to peace (Ferrera, 2002, pp. 13-14).

For the conflict in southern Thailand (Patani), the region of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and four districts of Songkha provinces. The root cause of conflict is the competing of power struggle between Malay Muslim movement became more distinct upon “political legitimacy” over the Deep South of Thailand. The violence from the clashing of a movement’s militant wing and Thai security agencies had emerged on the late 2001 and escalated since January 2004. Since 2004, after a large group of insurgents raided Army depot in Narathiwat, more than 6,000 deaths and injury of nearly 12,000 people (Jitpiromsri, 2016) from violence and counter-violence. This brings region controlled by Thai State and security agencies by enforcing special laws such as emergency decree and martial law. It led to several cases on human rights violation by the army since then.

After the outbreaking situations, there was the effort of government but they often excluded the participation of people and civil society organizations. At the beginning of the conflict in 2004-2005, the three policies of Thaksin Shinawatra’s government only focused on restructuring and integrating government bureaucracy in the region but did not drive the other sectors including civil society to solve the southern problem seriously. Even civil society had more opening space to talk about their problems, but their role was less relevant. In 2005, there was the National Reconciliation Commission or NRC, the independent commission that responded to resolve the problem by providing a public space to a dialogue and meeting among government officials, religious leaders and local leaders to find a solution in the region (Jitpiromsri, 2008).

Even there were important recommendations from NRC but some argued that NRC report did not mention about the core of conflict as competing of power struggle between Malay Muslim movement and Thai State upon “political legitimacy” over the Deep South of Thailand. The claim of violence in the report was only a work of small number of ‘bad’ people (McCargo, 2010, pp. 83-84) and finally the role of NRC was fading since military coup in 2006. After the coup, civilian state agency played the role rather

than military while there was expanding violence and unstable political situation, independent civil society actors, alternative and local media, academic institutions had been creating a remarkable public sphere for promoting a culture of peace and the way to transform the underlying conflict. They were all supported in many scope of works mainly were rehabilitation, human right, communication, local economics and development but they were fragmented and depending on financial support (Civil Society Council of Southern Thailand, 2016).

During 2006-2012, the power of civil society had been growing steadily, they began to assemble as the prominent networks before 2012 such as the emergence of the Women Civil Society Network, the Muslim Attorney Centre and Civil Society Council of Southern Thailand. Moreover, academic communities both inside and outside the region had the opportunity to raise the core issue of the conflict as the power struggle between Malay Muslim movement and Thai State. The decentralization issue upon “political legitimacy” over the Deep South of Thailand also raised as the political solution rather than militarization. In 2012, there was many decentralized models proposed from academics, CSOs and politicians (Civil Society Council of Southern Thailand, 2016).

Under the emerging Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s administration (2011-2014), by 2013 on 28 February at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, there was a signing of a General Consensus on Peace Dialogue Process between the Government of Thailand and Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the secretive and strongest organization movement. Even there was a good sign for peace but society both in and outside region criticized the government peace talk policy to illegal insurgent group and questioned to the representativeness of Ustaz Hassan Taib. On 25 October 2014 a new group emerged called the Majlis Syura Patani (Patani Consultative Council) or MARA Patani⁽²⁾. Envisioned as an umbrella organisation uniting the

(2) MARA Patani comprised six organisations: 1) Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN 2); 2) Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani (BIPP); 3) Pertubuhan Persatuan Pembebasan (PULO-P4); 4) Pertubuhan Pembebasan Bersatu (PULO-dspp); 5) Pertubuhan Pembebasan Bersatu (PULO-mkp); and 6) Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP).

disparate Malay-Patani groups, their aim was to seek a political solution to the conflict through peace negotiations with the Thai government which began in March 2015.

With respect to the conflict in the southern Thailand under the present National Council for Peace and Order administration (NCPO), there is confusing signals from the Government of Thailand to contribute commitment and sincerity to the peace talk. On the other hands, it is the fact that there is internal conflict among movement organizations, without the explicit endorsement of the BRN, recognized as the most influential movement with the largest number of fighters, MARA's status as the representative of the movement organizations remains unclear. With the violence that still going on and wary political circumstance is challenging to CSOs. The strengthen role of CSOs in the region in the last 5 years may shade the light and move toward durable peace but their more power engagement in the peace process in southern Thailand is still needed.

2. Structure Dimension

For the structural dimension, it can be said that CSOs in Mindanao has contributed significantly to manage conflict in the region, they are generally autonomous in nature, free from government control and military influences (Rood, 2005, p.3). The CSOs in Mindanao can be divided in six categories First, development NGOs which is the network of networks. Second, religious organizations funded by international NGOs related to peace and conflict management. Third, the business bodies that involved in the political sphere. Fourth, the political NGOs associated with different individuals and parties who not directly competing for political power such as MNLF aims for an ethno-nationalist solution while MILF seeks and Islamic solution (Rood, 2005, p.14). Fifth, the organization that devoted to considerable attention to peacebuilding such as monitoring cease-fire, interfaith dialogue, promoting the role of women for peace in Mindanao.

Finally, the groups and networks based in Manila and abroad that contributed to managing

the conflict. Also the organizations that works with communities for providing technical assistance throughout the Philippines in conflict-affected areas including Mindanao. Many international NGOs support many peace program in Mindanao such as Publications of Conciliation Resources in London, International Alert working for business and social progress, also the Asia Foundation works with academic institutions and NGOs throughout Mindanao (Rood, 2005, p.15).

Besides the categories of CSOs in Mindanao, the three major areas of CSOs are interreligious dialogues, creation of local space for peace and involvement on the peace process. In this article, to focus on the peace process, the involvement of CSOs in the peace process which has the wide range from advocating the framework of peace process to involving in the implementation of framework agreement explicitly. The initiative of six paths to peace of National Unification Commission or NUC came from the idea of religious leaders and CSOs in 1992. The six principles and also with the other legislations are the path to negotiation track between the government and the different rebel groups (Santos, 2005,p.7-8).

Consultation to GPH and MILF is also role of CSOs, at the beginning of Arroyo' administration in 2001, her all-out-peace policy gained support from the representatives of business sector and religious leaders after many failed peace negotiations. For example, before first formal peace negotiation in Tripoli in 2001, CSOs networks held the parallel peace panel with the formal negotiations, the prominent participant such as Irene Santiago, the committee of Mindanao Commission on Mother for Peace. However, the consultation process at that time did not include to the wider groups of people but one or two people in the process (Zozobrado, 2010). But on later period, the representativeness CSOs is more inclusive even they still have the little effect on public opinion (Rood, 2005, p.19).

Another role in of CSOs is observing and monitoring the ceasefire agreement. Among the continuous violence, CSOs also monitored conflict situation in the communities by promoting the ceasefire. However,

their role go beyond consultation or peace forum, they desire to involve directly in the peace negotiation. In 2004 Sylvia Paraguya, the president of Mindanao Caucus of Development NGOs-MinCODE was only a representative of woman and indigenous of GPH peace panel (Panjor, 2014). In the case of Mindanao, CSOs in the region take role in forging sustainable peace, they put very much efforts and have a strength in diversity, infrastructure and participation collective community but with the limitation especially on promoting wider public recognition on the peace process.

For southern Thailand, after the unrest during 2004-2007, a number of human rights violations in region drawn the attention of international organizations and Bangkok-based organizations. The protection and monitoring functions of human rights were internalized into the grass-roots population by CSOs in the region especially women and youth groups who highly affected by violent incidents. However, their role has changed, women groups gradually involved political aspects of peace building and raised the visibility of local women in the public while youth maintained their activities to empower young people. Moreover, local media is a factor to support and strengthen civil society efforts via positive media coverage while mainstream media often play a destructive sides of the situation in south Thailand.

In 2007-2013, in term of the peace process, due to the changing of political circumstance in the region. The regaining of Southern Border Province Administration Center (SBPAC) in 2007 and the Prime Minister's order 206/2549 indicated in the policy of supporting Peace in southern Thailand has opened the political sphere for CSOs and people forcing for peace by forming the different networks and working for their different agenda. The example of the prominent networks are the Civil Society Council of Southern Thailand, Women's Agenda for Peace, Muslim Attorney Council (MAC) and Buddhists Networks for Peace. Though there were many networks have shown their capacity and strength but their political solution and conflict understanding in the region was in the different

way (Civil Society Council of Southern Thailand, 2016).

Between this period, academic communities in the region and beyond tried to share practical experiences of decentralization conflict and peacebuilding. In 2009, there was a seminar on civil society and the peace process in Bangkok held by Center for Peace and Conflict studies, Chulalongkorn University. The seminar was a first learning space for to understand the role of CSOs in peace process (O-In, 2012, p. 16). Moreover, in 2011, the idea of "Insiders Peace builders Platform (IPP)" was initiated. This project is the integration of diverse civil society organizations in the region to share the experiences through dialogues and the academic tools for systemic thinking on the problems. This common space has already created a momentum of dialogues for peace in southern Thailand recently (O-In 2012, p. 100).

Even though, the conventional actors local media and women as such are also visible at different phase of conflict and the government has accepted more actors from civil society in their decision-making process and CSOs in general has gained substantive relationship with the ruling governments, however, its visibility does not come with an affirmed power to put pressure on certain actions yet. This is because, the peace process since 2013 in southern Thailand is very fragile and the process has been going on with confidentiality. The mutual trust need to be strengthen both inter and intra conflict parties (O-In, 2012, p. 123).

3. Values dimension

There are many indicators to measure in which value CSOs can achieve to peace such as democracy, transparency, tolerance, non-violence, gender-equity, poverty eradication and environmental sustainability. In this article, the measuring of all this indicator may be limited but some relevant indicators can be described. For the Philippines, after 17 years for the peace negotiations, there are many campaigns supported CSOs peace activities from rebuilding of lives and communities community to peace monitoring. The values reflected from these the efforts and promoting the value of democracy for the participation of CSOs

which reflect the first principle of National Unification Commission (NUC) is to pursuit of social, economic political reform and consensus-building with empowerment for peace.

For the value of tolerance and democracy, these two indicators highlighted the positive changes on the tolerance of government and rebel groups to have a greater consciousness on the respect international humanitarian law (IHL) above their military objectives even on the whole HR and IHL violations continue (Santos, 2005, p.8). In terms of democracy value, the positive force of CSOs moving forward to peace explicitly criticizing the government's policy to find alternative way to address conflict settlement through political dialogue. The signing of Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro in 2012 between GPH and MILF involve more women to participate in policy making which supporting gender-equity. Also the participation of the variety of Bangsamoro people to draft the Bangsamoro Basic Law also reflected as democratic value in the political reform.

For southern Thailand, if asked to choose between democracy and economic growth, quite few people in Thailand would sacrifice democracy (Albritton & Bureekul, 2007, pp. 11-12). Generally, Civil society in Thailand is regarded with suspicious and contempt by the state. (Phatharananuth, 2006, pp. 6-8). So, democratic values are thus not properly grounded in Thailand, which weakens the potential impact of the civil society. The homogenization politics have even managed to shatter the once existing inter-ethnic communities in Southern Thailand. From 2004-2012, the recurring conflict in southern Thailand has intensified, and has been transformed into intra-state conflict. The political and legal environment have not seriously promoted inter-ethnic political inclusion (Human Right Watch, 2007, p. 13)

In terms of peace process, during 2005-2012, there were many informal peace talks but most civil society organizations did not know about unsuccessful peace talk situation in the past and did not recognize their role to rebuild and make trust to the conflict parties. However, after 2013, there was first presence

of formal peace dialogue process, CSOs could consolidate their networks to support peace talk through advocating the government policy. However, it is interesting that there is an intensive debate between different societal groups with opposing standpoints of peace dialogue because of their oriented to different political ideologies. As the result, many civil society organizations still distrusted to one another and among them there are pro and cons on peace negotiation. The divided CSOs situation also contribute less tolerance and distrust among conflict parties.

4. Impact dimension

In terms of impact, to make impact from supporting peace negotiation, to advocate their needs that is influential to the policy makers. For Mindanao CSOs, in 1990, civil society groups lacked access during the negotiations for the final peace agreement. The example of the implementation of an agreement in 1996 which unveiled concessions to the MNLF led to overwhelming opposition from Christian areas and the question of legitimacy which leads to the challenge of policy position. Moreover, even there were much support within the Philippine government as efforts to achieve a negotiated peace and most members of the security forces believed that victory is possible. Thus, there were internal debates characterize all Philippine national administrations and peace negotiations were hampered (Oquist, 2002)

To move toward a sustainable peace and developmental policy in Mindanao, much of the activity of civil society aimed at building the constituency for the developmental approach. Civil society thus far had almost no success in influencing public opinion which was not surprising since are unknown to most people. However, since the Estrada administration's "all-out-war" in 2000, there has been a concerted effort to explain to Manila elites about the issues behind possible peace in Mindanao. In this way, it seems that developmental policies to resolve root causes of the conflict are able to withstand the skepticism of politicians who respond to the victory position's popularity among the Christian electorate (Rood, 2005, p. 33).

Certainly, military solutions are impossible on the all-out-war policy and CSOs in all its variety lobbies against the victory position and sees itself as already a constituency for peace. The media coverage of civil society activities can influence the decisions of political elites out of proportion to the scope of mobilization of civil society. Moreover, peace movement often look for a wider role in building an agenda for sustainable peace. Depending on ideological leanings, they coalesce with business organizations in the Kusog Mindanao movement and Church-influenced groups in particular talk about “peace transformation” (Rood, 2005, p. 34)

Thus civil society’s most important effect was achieved by lobbying on particular issues but political contestation among the various perspectives takes place within the government at any time. The ability of civil society to affect governmental decision making varies from administration to administration and within administrations. Moreover, CSOs can promote discussion of options for peace-including draft peace agreements devised by both sides. The many times revised versions of draft the implementation of FAB on the Bangsamoro Basic Law of CSOs on 2012 onward showing the participation of CSOs in direct decision making.

For southern Thailand, when considering impact dimension, even CSOs have been taking more proactive role recently in peace process by 2013 onward by pushing many proposals calling to stop the violence and ceasefire. However, CSOs still has low levels of participation in the peace process due to unstable politics and distrust between conflict parties including dividing among CSOs supporting and suspicious to the peace talk. Nevertheless, CSOs is still pursuing many roles in peace process because political sphere opened to them. Although there has been some recognition of the role that civil society has to play in the peace process, the challenge remains to bring the conflict parties, particularly the military wing of liberation movements, to engage in the political arena.

■ Lessons on the comparative of the two cases CSOs from Mindanao and southern Thailand

This concept background section underlined that the role of CSOs in the peace process is varied. A number of researches found that CSOs is a significant actors although in the reality, there is a less chance for them on the negotiation table. Leading research such as Thania Paffenholz has explored about the role of civil society in the peace process on global perspective. She have argued that civil society involve many dimension of peace process beyond the context and relationship with the state. Based on two cases analysis, CSOs completely do not have role in peace negotiation, the influence of CSOs in two countries was quite limited both in prodemocracy country like the Philippines and authoritarian democracy in Thailand as such. From the study, by applying the CSI framework, the role of CSOs in both countries is more different than similar. For the environment dimension, since 1990s Mindanao CSOs collaborated with government to ground the six basic principles of NUC which paving the way of forging the policy for the peace process in the succeeded presidency, whilst the constituted NRC in 2004 which composed of many recommendations did not mention about the separatism problem which need another alternative political solution.

For the structure dimension, CSOs in the both countries has significantly managed conflict in the similar scope of development such as social trust building and empowerment. However, in the Mindanao context, a wider range of CSOs involved in conflict resolution including religious groups and business sectors which help as the community bridge builders and peace advocator on the cost of conflict. For southern Thailand, there are less the religious groups and business sectors involve in the peace building while Mindanao CSOs motivated the grassroots peacebuilding initiative and calling for peace zone and cease-fire and heal the wound of war by bring warring communities in the mid 2002. For southern Thailand, the idea of peace zone seems inapplicable in region, many promoting safe spaces still targeted by the chronic violence with less progress of peace talk since 2013.

Nevertheless, there are the positive change on the effort of CSOs to involve more on the peace process in southern Thailand, the socialization and facilitation activities has created awareness among CSOs to have more role in decision-making, monitoring peace talk, increasing more relationship with the government and influencing to the political wing of the movement. For the value dimension, after all-out-war policy, the tolerance and impact GPH and MILF in peace negotiation in political solution encouraged CSOs to involve in the peace process, whilst the situation of peace talk is still uncertain and disclosed to public. This create constraint of CSOs in southern Thailand to continue the advocacy and push any recommendations. As the result, less impact from southern Thailand CSOs to the peace talk while there is a limitation of CSOs in Mindanao in the peace process for promoting board peace agenda to the wider the Philippine public opinion.

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